Interjections, such as those in the title, together with a few similar devices, when qualifying clauses expressing truth-conditions, or that such conditions have been satis ed, are entitled 'force-ampli ers' . Disputes between de ationary and in ationary truth-theories sometimes are assumed to turn on the supposed pivotal role that these devices are construed as playing in the interpretation of the clauses they qualify. I argue that they are not dispensable add-ons. Moreover, even in their absence the relevant clauses giving truth-conditions permit interpretations that are not de ationary-friendly. I maintain that this is a signi cant fact about the use to which writers put them. I then defend a thesis about force-ampli ers that makes them indispensable to the interpretation of the relevant clauses, and that renders certain moves unavailable to popular de ationist treatments.
It is not essential to the issues I shall raise that interjections like these be present. Sometimes a mere in ection, or the addition of a verbal particle will serve, as in 'He thought the earth moves and the earth does move' . I concentrate on the interjected words because they bring to the fore the point of this discussion. Let us call all such occurrences of words from this group (or their translations), even emphases, when, and only when, used in the stating of truth-conditions or their satisfaction (/non-satisfaction) forceampli ers. Force-ampli cation is not the only role of these sorts of elements, perhaps not even their primary one. But, as I hope to show, it cannot be ignored; its regular undervaluing (viz., o hand dismissal) has had an impact on the give-and-take over theories of truth. Much later I extend the role of force-ampli cation beyond truth, to referential relations generally. However, for the bulk of this essay I want to focus on truth. We may use the cover term 'signi cation' (verb: 'signify') for all the various semantic word-world, speaker-world, or thought-world relations covered (such as predication and reference) by such terms.
I shall use 'proposition' , unless otherwise speci ed, as an all-purpose truth-bearer. Some have insisted that a proposition is what is expressed rather than the vehicle of expression. But when the predicate 'is true' or the operator 'it is true that' is deployed, philosophers have taken the term to apply to a sentence, an assertion (/statement), and, whenever X is a propositional attitude, what is X-ed. As used here 'proposition' can serve as a cover term for each of these candidate truth-bearers.
Our four cases exemplify certain lessons. Some force-ampli ers occur in conditionals or biconditionals, others in conjunctions. e third case above shows that force-ampli ers need not occur in compounds and need not specify the proposition in question. e second one illustrates that words for truth need not occur in the formula, and that the truth-condition in question may be phrased di erently from the proposition whose truth it is standing for. (For simplicity, and with one pointed exception, I employ only specications which do not deviate in this way from those of their truth-bearers.) Nevertheless, each of the right-hand sides mentioned above specify a truthcondition (or, that one is met) for what is mentioned on the le -hand side of the formula. at feature is the focus of my discussion.
is is an exception to the 'only'-restriction in the earlier formulation. I leave it unmodi ed because the exception is an isolated case, our interest throughout the bulk of this discussion is on truth-conditions, and the cases of stating truth or referential conditions does x on the force-ampli cation role of these devices.
e one thing it fails to cover are ultra-Russellian propositions that, having individuals and property-instances as their constituents, are indistinguishable from states of a airs and (would-be) facts.
e claim defended in this essay is that force-ampli ers supply instructions for taking the clauses they govern a certain way.
ey compel us to adopt what I later describe as a semantically di erentiated reading (or interpretation). Some of those I am critiquing below, so-called "de ationary theorists" may accept that much. But, as I hope to show, that requires that we understand their signature formulas in ways incompatible with the conclusions they seek to draw from them. ese points can be understood properly only a er we have explained in greater detail what is meant by a semantically di erentiated interpretation. However, getting clearer on semantically di erentiated readings will require that we also say something about truthcondition speci cations in which ampli cation is merely optional, which, in turn, takes us to the heart of de ationary theories of truth. We shall take up the rst two of these (viz., semantically di erentiated interpretations and optional readings) in subsequent sections, but I turn rst to a brief sketch of de ationary theories of truth.
De ationism (about truth, herea er understood) embraces a broad spectrum of theories, in which one of two constructions plays a central role. e two, given here schematically, are: (R) e proposition that p is true i p. (Or 'It is true that p i p') (T) S is true (in L) i p in which 'S' contains a structural description (or, quotation name framed in object-language terms) of p in the relevant metalanguage. De ationists regularly take one of these to yield basically adequate accounts of the concept truth. (I henceforth call them and their respective instances 'equivalences' .) Whenever the sentence/proposition in question is displayed, de ationists hold that this is all truth amounts to, while proposing supplementary accounts for occurrences in which the bearer is not, or cannot be, displayed. But (R) and (T) are believed to expose the structure for the general case, the one which concerns us. All de ationary theorists are committed, more or less explicitly, to the following two theses about these cases:
(D ) e central case shows that we can have an adequate account of truth without a metaphysical or relational theory of truth (say, correspondence or coherence).
(R) in particular may create a worry about semantic paradoxes, a worry I set aside as orthogonal to the present discussion. If one prefers, one can think of an extremely long or inexhaustible list of instances of atomic propositions in (R)-one of the views called 'minimalism'-as the relevant de ationist theory.
(D ) What (R) and (T) show is that, in the central cases, whatever can be conveyed in a sentence or thought employing mention of truth can be more economically conveyed without it.
By a correspondence theory I mean any view stating that truth is constituted by the relation of the truth-bearer to something on the order of a state of a airs, fact, circumstance, situation, or even by a combination of individuals and properties. e inspiration behind (D ) is to replace this sort of theory with one that lacks metaphysical or relational implications. us, by de ationism I intend to cover views that have typically gone under titles such as redundancy, disquotationalism, minimalism, and prosententialism. Despite their signi cant di erences, each puts their view forward as a candidate for the slot which correspondence might otherwise occupy, thus their commitments to (D ) and (D ). e exceptions-e.g., generalizations (say, 'all propositions of the form ⌜p or not p⌝ are true'), indirect descriptions (say, 'what Smithers said is true')-are supplied only to show what utility a truth predicate might nevertheless have.
My discussion proceeds as follows. In § I consider formulas in the spirit of (R) and (T), and introduce my target interpretation. In § Alfred Tarski's view, the locus classicus of (T), is re-examined, largely because it is believed in some circles that Tarski's pioneering work leads ineluctably to this sort of de ationism-a view I there reject. In § we return to the topic of forceampli ers, explaining both the popular view I reject and one I defend. To strengthen my thesis, and weaken its leading alternative, in § I consider a series of occurrences of ampli ers in the literature. In § yet further support for my claims is discovered in implications for closely related uses of the entitled expressions. Finally, in § the thesis is extended to other referential relations.
. First, the equivalences. Consider the familiar instances of our two schemata: E.g. ". . . we nd that in all sentences of the form 'p is true, ' the phrase 'is true' is logically super uous. " (Ayer , ) . "[W]e can simply lop o 'It is true that' from (R) and it will make no di erence to what we want to say. " (Williams , ) . Not every de ationist acknowledges (D ), and others have denied that de ationists are committed to it. But if they do not accept (D ), I do not see how they can believe they are entitled to (D ). at is not to imply that this is the whole of their argument: they point to other cases, in which semantic ascent is supposed to display the utility of a truth-predicate. But how could they claim it is the whole of the predicate's utility without (D )? Some writers who take one of these titles reject a commitment to de ationism. e distinction in § explains what enables them to do so.
'Snow is white' is true i snow is white.
e proposition that snow is white is true i snow is white.
ese are the homophonic, or homographic, instances de ationists take as most illustrative of the force of their view. On them, to obtain the righthand cognitive twin of the le -hand side, while scrapping the contentious truth predicate, for (R) we simply denominalize the proposition, or, for (T), disquote the sentence. (Regarding (T) this is a bit more involved because of the needed coordination between metalanguage and object language. I set aside the technical details here.) If this is the whole of the relevant point of the equivalences in the context, (D ) is the obvious lesson. We then obtain (D ) by showing that if so, there is no need to introduce the sorts of relations characterizing metaphysical theories of truth. (And if the message of (D ) is not instrumental here, it is di cult for me to see how else (D ) might be shown.) Call this reading of the equivalences an austere gloss. Some have concluded that it allows one's account of truth to remain neutral with respect to any metaphysical implications of its concept or property, others draw the more ambitious conclusion that there is no need for worldly truthmakers anywhere. In either case, de ationism must be construed as involved in the same ballgame as correspondence and other traditional theories, for it promotes itself as a competing answer to a common set of questions.
De ationists are thus committed to an austere gloss. But there is another, and (I believe) more natural, interpretation of the equivalences than austerity-a semantically di erentiated interpretation (or, more simply, a differentiated interpretation).
To start us o , notice that once we look past the occurrence of 'is true' , the most salient di erence between the sides of both schematic equivalences is the following. eir le -hand sides contain compound singular terms whose instances designate, express, or represent semantically evaluable items: nouns formed with propositional clauses and names of sentences. By this I do not mean that those phrases take semantic values such as true, but rather that what they designate are themselves creatures of semantics (propositions and sentences, respectively). How else could grammar allow them to take distinctively semantic predicates? However, save for specialized topics, in general the right-hand side of each does not take a semantic value. Although the vehicle in the formulas is a sentential phrase, di erential interpretation reads the right-hand side as "talking about" nothing but worldly (largely nonsemantic) items. A rst temptation might be to say that p introduces a state of a airs or a fact; and at least on the face of things states of a airs I write loosely as if the schematic letters, and not just their substituends are designating expressions.
and facts are not semantic units. While that seems to me to be basically correct, it may be contested-indeed, has been-on two counts.
First, objections have been raised against the philosophical usefulness of notions such as state of a airs and fact, or against principles for individuating them. I shall not probe these allegations further here, but simply note that although some nonde ationists (= in ationists) also accept such objections, it has not prevented them from recognizing something or other as a truthmaker that is not evaluable in semantic terms.
us, unless it is assumed that those philosophers are all quite confused, this is scarcely a mortal blow to nonde ationist interpretations.
Second, it is sometimes claimed that representational notions such as mentioning, referring, naming, designating, denoting, signifying, expressing, or even representing itself do not apply at the level of whole sentences. Notoriously, Frege thought that a sentence had a Bedeutung or object to which it referred. For standard, extensional cases he chose its truth or falsity. Even when philosophers suppose that whole sentences refer, Frege's solution is not widely accepted nowadays, save as a premiss from which to construct reductios against certain theories of truth, causation, or fact. And problems about the way in which sententially-articulated entities represent, or what they represent, persist.
Notwithstanding these di culties, it seems beyond question that many instances of p have individuable and identi able subject-matters. ey introduce a speci c target in a way not limited to the designations of their isolated subject-terms or to extensions of their predicates. Consider a straightforward subject-predicate sentence-say, 'Smithers is awake' . We may take the subject-matter of the proposition expressed by that sentence (on an occasion of use) as including both the subject referred to and the property or action expressed as belonging to (or denied of) that subject. Of course, the proposition might be false, in which case Smithers does not have the property ascribed to him. Nevertheless, the whole package forms the subjectmatter of this sort of proposition.
us, the sentence is, in this broader sense, about Smithers being awake, or about a combination (plus a certain structure) of Smithers, the relation of being in or having, and the state of wakefulness. To deny that there is a distinctive subject-matter here commits one to the view that the sentence's semantics does not suit it for stating one sort of thing any more than any other sentence would-say, the sentences 'the blade is rusty' or 'Smithers is a Rotarian' . And if one goes that far, it is hard to see how we can account, in ordinary circumstances, for our indispensable practice of choosing any particular sentence rather than any other to convey what we want to communicate. Whatever di culties there Dealt with more fully in (Vision , ch . ) are in formulating this point rigorously, the need for some such relationship is unavoidable on any serious scheme. I shall henceforth use the term 'subject-matter' for the sort of thing that is relevant to a sentence (or a sentence as used) in this way. And, as with austere glosses, on di erentiated interpretations we can extend the notion to other combinations of contents, in particular to conjunctions such as that in our second example-viz., 'Fred believed the damage was due to a natural disaster and, indeed, it was due to an earthquake' . What has been said thus far is compatible with a broad selection of different views about how to construe the notion of a subject-matter. Still, it is clear that whatever the details, the subject-matter of replacements for p in our equivalences are not likely to be semantically evaluable creatures as such. In a standard sort of case, they will be states or would-be states of the world. In the rare case, they may be about what is semantically evaluable.
us, in the instance:
e proposition that snow is white is true is true if and only if that snow is white is true a phrase on the right-hand side ('that snow is white') designates something that is semantically evaluable. But this results from special features of the case at hand, not from a general trait of such equivalences. at the subjectmatter of the right-hand side is not a semantically evaluable unit per se is a striking feature whose implications threaten the de ationist line. De ationists encourage us to pay attention to little more than the similar phrasing of the two sides, and conclude simply that the equivalences show that what has been stated with the predicate 'is true' can be stated without it, or that "nothing is added to the thought by ascribing to it the property of truth" (Frege , ) . Still, the case for semantically-di erentiated interpretations need not rest on the idea of a subject-matter. Suppose there are no worldly correlates for whole sentences. en let us say that the right-hand sides acquire their semantic connections simply via their incorporated referential terms and the designations or expressions of their predicates and relational expressions. Combining these elements need constitute no unit such as a "fact" or "state of a airs" that we can then deploy for theorizing.
e right-hand side can pick out worldly-conditions or a series of them, which may produce the truth-conditions for the proposition or sentence on the le -hand side. It may then follow that because we have arrived at this Is Frege then a de ationist? I refuse to enter into this exegetical quagmire. But comments such as the one cited here have certainly inspired others who de nitely consider themselves de ationists.
by nothing more than re ection on the equivalences, truth's connection to things and properties in the world should not be excluded from its concept.
e foregoing considerations leave it open that the relation may be one-many, but not that the formula as a whole is to be taken nonrelationally.
ere is a legitimate philosophical di erence over the existence of factlike entities, on which it is certainly an option to take a nominalist or eliminativist view. But to suppose that the position one takes, say, on facts versus individuals-plus-properties can mark a distinction between relational and nonrelational theories of truth would mislocate that di erence. In (D ) it is denied that a proposition's worldly connections, including those of its subpropositional ingredients, enter our concept of truth. at commitment requires much more than scrapping facts and their kin. On the other hand, a nonde ationist, say a correspondence theorist, need only insist that it is integral to our concept of truth that, at least in the central cases, reality makes bearers true or false. is modest claim is enough to set up a relational theory of truth, whatever the details. To create a true alternative to relational views a de ationist must disclaim as canonical all di erential interpretations of the equivalences. However, because the right-hand side contains no semantically evaluable item de jure we cannot rely only on the similarity in appearance of the formulas on both sides as showing that they convey just the same thing. By itself this is enough to undermine e orts to extract from the equivalences the lesson of (D ). In the usual case, the right-hand side delivers a worldly condition, or a combination of worldly ingredients, accounting for the applicability of the truth predicate in its other term.
Even here, some will protest that de ationists can, and do, accept a differentiated reading of (R) and (T) if all that amounts to is that the le -hand side must contain something semantically evaluable while the right-hand need not. But it is not altogether unheard of for theorists to help themselves to platitudes which their prior commitments prohibit. And I have yet to see what de ationists, even recent soi-disant "minimalists", believe can be made of the right-hand side of the equation while maintaining (D ). Perhaps the response is that they are entitled to a semantically di erentiated readFor simplicity I ignore the variation of a correspondence theory holding that it is only the property of truth, not its concept, that need be correspondentist, as well as the de ationary view that although truth's metaphysical liaisons are excluded from its concept, the property of truth may allow them back in. Although I believe the view both controversial, and, even if true, patently inadequate (see Vision , -), it has been so widely held that all a de ationist (or minimalist) needs to claim about the equivalences is that the two sides have the same truth-conditions that I mention it here just to acknowledge that this possibility has not been overlooked. Why cannot an in ationist hold this? If she can, what is distinctive about de ationism? And how could anything so blatantly circular be a theory of truth? ing because no proposition is explicitly invoked on the right-hand side of their formulas (and, thus, that side cannot be semantically evaluated). But this seems to me to leave their position up in the air. If minimalists fail to invoke a proposition on the right-hand side of their equivalences only because they take their construction to be neutral with respect to the proper correlate for a correspondence theorist, or to the debate between the various truth theories (e.g., correspondence. coherence, and pragmatism), or both, then they simply fail to say enough. e more speci c views on which they refuse to settle are all substantive-thus, relational and metaphysical. One has not produced an alternative to a list of substantive views just by failing to opt for one of its items. A genus is not an alternative to, or in competition with, its various species. On the other hand, if the lack of commitment to a substantive truth theory is intended to mark the fact that nothing on the right-hand side remains to be speci ed (for the concept of truth), it is hard to see how they can avoid committing themselves to the view that the only relevant thing is the proposition displayed there. at appears to be a basic move to (D ). But, if we are to avoid the absurd conclusion that propositions in which truth is explicitly ascribed (either predicated or prefaced in a sentential operator) are in general made true by the proposition obtained when we amputate the truth ascription, then the formulas, as understood by minimalists, can tell us no more about truth than is revealed by examples such as: e proposition that snow is white is true i le jugement que la neige est blanche est vrai.
at formula certainly does not yield the conditions for the truth of the proposition that snow is white, but tells us at most that two propositions (or two expressions of one proposition) have the same truth-conditions. e fact that "they" are true or false together is not evidence, as some might declare, that the le -hand proposition does not have or need any truthconditions beyond the speci er in the instances of (R). If we are to understand the right-hand side of (R) in this way, it provides nothing more than my hybrid English-French specimen. Finally, if the de ationist declines any of these understandings of her equivalences, the view has yet to tell us anything. We have an elementary understanding of what the words on the righthand side mean, but not of what they signify. us, while we grasp something, we do not yet know what is being a rmed.
A hint of the problem may be contained in my deliberately unguarded use of 'gloss' in the phrase 'austere gloss' . A gloss may range from a statement of a lesson learned from a construction to a reformulation (either qua analysis or paraphrase) of what is literally conveyed in it. Setting aside issues of conversational implicature, let us grant that re ection on instances of (R) may, in some sense, reveal that we convey more economically with the right-hand side of the biconditional just the message that we could convey with the words on the le -hand side. at may be a lesson of these instances. (Of course, this only applies to cases in which the proposition in question is explicitly displayed, not to cases like 'What she said is true' .) However, it would be a mistake to infer from this alone that it makes the right-hand side an adequate analysis or paraphrase of what is expressed on the le -hand side. I doubt that any worthy de ationist has been taken in by the vagaries of 'gloss' to commit this non-sequitur. But it is not implausible to venture that some have wrongly inferred from what we can take away as a lesson of these instances to the conclusion that the two sides convey (that is, semantically express) the same thing.
In light of the possibility of di erentiated interpretation, we must be circumspect when construing what others have intended when displaying (T) or (R) in their expositions. For it would be a mistake to suppose that authors have not been at least implicitly aware of this distinction between their right and le sides. In fact, it seems clear that a di erentiated interpretation is a quite natural one across the board. Some who have supposed that word-world relations were essential to any concept of truth, whether or not they have been full-blown correspondence theorists, have also accepted the equivalences, and, on occasion have supposed that their substantial, relational truth theories could be extracted from a proper reading of them. Whereas de ationists have been quick to deny that these theorists have succeeded, they have been less solicitous in trying to come to grips with just what nonde ationists might have had in mind, or why the latter could even have regarded them as insurance against a de ationary reading. Might not it be the case that what metaphysical truth theorists were up to is readily explained by the fact that they noted (what de ationists have been at pains to suppress) just this di erentiation in the two sides?
In introducing a semantically-di erentiated interpretation of the equivalences I am not claiming that the de ationist cannot rely on an austere gloss of the equivalences to argue her case. For one thing, there are many arguments for de ationism that have nothing to do with this issue. A de ationist can regard an austere gloss as a consequence of those other arguments. (I do claim that a reliance on the view that an austere gloss is the only one in play has unwelcome consequences for the nal position. Although this might be a blow against the individual arguments for de ationism, that would require a more thorough analysis of those arguments than is intended here.) For another thing, a de ationist can still maintain that just because the lehand term can be replaced without loss by the right-hand term, whatever
worldly conditions the latter or its ingredients may gesture toward has nothing to do with truth. ( is seems to have been factored into the thinking of some authors. ) is familiar de ationist strategy is consistent with acknowledging a di erentiated interpretation. Nevertheless, once we allow a di erentiated interpretation, the dialectical prospects are narrowed. Certain moves no longer work. For one thing, the di erentiated interpretation is a su cient explanation of why a nonde ationist can acknowledge the equivalences. us, it is unwarranted to suppose that an austere interpretation is all that users of the equivalence could have had in mind. In this connection, it is a mistake to suppose that in ationary theorists commit a tactical error, possibly a fatal one, in accepting one of these equivalences. Both claims seem to rely on the implausible assumption that the equivalences themselves are su cient to warrant an austere gloss without bene t of further argument or explanation.
. I just alluded to disputes surrounding di erential and austere readings of the equivalences. A good start in coming to appreciate the role of these disagreements is the battle for the allegiance of Alfred Tarski. Tarski's Convention T (to a close enough approximation, our (T)) has been central in such disagreements. While many commentators regard Tarski as providing at least the skeleton of an in ationist, if not a correspondence, view, there can be no question that (T), along with (R), has inspired much de ationary theory. In fact, some de ationists, including Wolfgang Künne, take Tarski for one of their own, ignoring the counterevidence for a di erential reading by, among other things, so -pedaling his use of force-ampli ers. Let us take a closer look at some relevant Tarskian text and Künne's commentary on it. Apparently out of step with what was to become a popular tune for (T)'s later employments, Tarski had written, "We regard the truth of a sentence as its 'agreement with reality"' (Tarski b, ) . And in the introduction to the classical exposition of his view, (Tarski a, ) , he states, "throughout this work I shall be concerned exclusively with grasping the intentions which are contained in the so-called classical conception of truth ('trueagreeing with reality')". On its most natural reading, those words imply that truth is a relation between something broadly linguistic and normally extralinguistic ingredients and a di erentiated interpretation of the equivalences. Moreover, in a later summary of those views he notes Aristotle's famous dictum on 'is false' and 'is true' , and suggests that what it a rms, updated, is captured in:
Perhaps David Lewis, e.g. , (Lewis ) and Soames ( ).
(i) e truth of a sentence consists in agreement with (or correspondence to) reality (Tarski , ) .
Immersing himself yet more deeply in in ationism, he writes that if we are allowed to use the notion of designation to apply to whole sentences (and not just names), "we could possibly use" the following:
(ii) A sentence is true if it designates an existing state of a airs (Tarski , ) .
e stunning fact about these mutually reinforcing passages is that Tarski seems willing to take on board such crucial features of in ationism in his paraphrases: in (i) 'in agreement with reality' is interpreted as 'correspondence to' , and in (ii) the correlate of a true sentence is described as "an existing state of a airs". Tarski quickly abandons mention of states of a airs, but he does not suggest that such items are illicit. Rather, he gives reasons for declining the use the expression in his project: rst, because, as an element of vague "commonplace language", it does not give us any reason to believe that its theory will be consistent (viz., will enable us to avoid familiar paradoxes), and, second, there is no need to mention states of a airs explicitly in his subsequent rigorous reformulations. Perhaps he shares the doubts aired in § about the very idioms by means of which we inaugurate facts and states of a airs into our conversation. But, that is not a reason he gives for refusing to talk about them. At most his grounds indicate that if we can have such intuitively appealing results without needing them to advance our theories, so much the better. Tarski's published objections go no farther. To avoid employing them in one's theory is not to discountenance them in one's ontology, especially if the alternative formulations are thought to be tantamount to the old ones. Indeed, the employment of phrases such as 'agreement with. . . reality' and 'existing state of a airs' in (i) and (ii), suggests that aside from their vagueness, they are not ontologically objectionable. Perhaps Tarski believed otherwise, but the passages typically cited for that claim do not even begin to make out the case for it.
Against this, Wolfgang Künne holds that it is a mistake to take such remarks to indicate that Tarski harbored a relational (= in ationary) conception of truth. He points out that immediately a er explaining that a sentence's truth is its agreement with reality Tarski adds: is rather vague phrase, which can certainly lead to various misunderstandings and has o en done so in the past, is interpreted as follows. . . [W]e shall accept as valid every sentence of the form 'the sentence x is true if and only if p' where 'p' is to be replaced by any sentence of the language under investigation and 'x' by any individual name of that sentence (Tarski a, ) .
Künne states that this shows that "the correspondence formula is elucidated with the help of T-equivalences" (Künne , ) . He tacitly assumes that this undermines Tarski's use of the correspondence formula as a way of showing that he was seriously explicating, or conforming to, a relational notion of truth.
is line of argument assumes an austere interpretation of the equivalences. However, in light of the existence of semantically-di erentiated interpretations, it is not only possible, but quite natural, for Tarski to have seen in the distinction mentioned between the relevant occurrences of 'S' (or 'x') and 'p' just the sort of relation between words and world that earlier correspondentists were striving to express, albeit less rigorously. Unless Künne gives us reason to rule out di erentiated readings, his claim is groundless. Beyond that, to suppose that Tarski was advancing an austere gloss suggests that he was being cagy in displaying (i) and (ii) as ways to interpret his views. Such surreptition would be quite out of character for a writer who was generally scrupulously clear in his expositions.
Still, there is more to Künne's case for austerity. He believes we must interpret Tarski's phrases in light of their treatment by his teacher, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, to whom the Wahrheitsbegri is dedicated. And, indeed, in an early footnote ( a, n), Tarski states of the latter's Gnosiology, "in writing the present article I have repeatedly consulted this book and in many points adhered to the terminology there suggested. " Furthermore, when Tarski (in Künne's restatement) gives as his proposition ( ):
For all sentences x, x is true ⇐⇒ x means that things are thus and so, and things are thus and so (Künne , ) , translation of Tarski ( a, ).
he adds in a footnote that "very similar formulations are found in T. Kotarbiński. . . , where they are treated as commentaries which explain approximately the classical view of truth" (Tarski a, n) . Künne concludes that we should turn to Kotarbiński for a deeper understanding of Tarski's super cially in ationary prose.
We shall consider Kotarbiński's own use of force-ampli ers, and Künne's commentary on them, in the next section. But, that aside, let us simply return to Künne's simple claim that Kotarbiński's understanding of truth is de ationary, "without any appeal to the notion of facts, but in thoroughly non-relational terms" (Künne , ) . In a passage we discuss more fully at is analogous to adverbialism with respect to perceptual content, in which the content clause of a perceptual verb is treated as a modi cation of the experience: crudely, 'S sees something red' is understood on adverbialism as 'S sees something-redly' . Similarly, truth is to be understood primarily in terms of the adverb 'truly' , which is in turn explained by the formula:
'(K) x thinks truly ⇐⇒ (x thinks that. . . , and. . . )'
where the blanks are lled uniformly. Again according to Künne, Kotarbiński's Reism, in which neither propositions nor any other brand of abstract entities exist, dictates that this adverb of manner, qualifying x's thinking, is the primary alethic notion. Nonadverbial truth and falsity are to be ultimately analyzed as quali cations of occasions of holding true. ere is nothing here, no mention of facts or states of a airs, on which to hang a relation between a verbal something and the nonverbal world. us, when Kotarbiński writes that in characterizing the classical theory of truth, although "[i]n the classical interpretation, truly means in accordance with reality" (Kotarbiński , ) , he quali es this by stating that "brief re ection su ces to recognize the metaphorical nature of such comparison. A di erent interpretation of 'accordance with reality' is required" (Kotarbiński , ) . Künne maintains that that interpretation is given by (K). In opposition to Künne's construal, I maintain, rst, that Tarski cannot have held an adverbialist or reist theory; second, that adverbialism and Reism are not even relevant to interpreting Kotarbiński here; and, nally, in the context Kotarbiński is not holding that a relational reading of truth (or its predicate or adverb) is up for consideration. Let us examine these points in order.
. e clearly adverbial language Kotarbiński uses should not be enough to read adverbialism even into his own philosophy. But let us suppose it is. Although the language in which Kotarbiński's line of argument is couched is not as transparent as we might hope, he seems to be most intent on denying the existence of abstract entities, such as propositions (≈ Fregean Gedanken), or types of sentences, statements, belief contents, etc. is led him to insist on a concrete truth-bearer; and the token believed (not the believing itself, but what is believed) had to be a concrete something. Presumably he could not nd anything conforming to his restriction, and to which he could attach truth, other than the state of belief itself. He wished to avoid reintroducing an abstraction via a conceptually distinguishable content. Conceivably this (Künne , ) . He is not himself convinced that the view works.
led him to suppose that he must attach it to the verb of belief itself, thus leading him to favor an adverbial construction over a predicative one.
If that is roughly the route by which Kotarbiński arrived at his conclusion, there is no way to accommodate it in Tarski's philosophy. For one thing, Tarski is not concerned with the objects of belief, but with language(s). For another, his truth-bearers are (type) sentences, and not sentences-quaasserted. Accordingly, there is no episode-of asserting, believing, entertaining, etc.-to be described verbally.
us, there is nothing to which to attach such an adverb. Tarski's views are quite out of the range of this sort of tinkering. If the adverbial treatment is therefore an essential ingredient in the case for reinterpreting 'accordance with reality' , as Künne presents it, it is di cult to see how it can bear on Tarski's view.
. When Tarski is most explicit about using Kotarbiński's terminology as a guide to his own (Tarski a, n ) , the latter is discussing the respective merits of classical (correspondence) and utilitarian (Jamesian pragmatist) theories of truth. And although Kotarbiński frames things in terms of 'truly' as well as 'true' (Kotarbiński , -) , that is not the point he is trying to get across, or the one Tarski seems intent on expressing in the context. e feature of each theory being stressed, for both Kotarbiński and Tarski, is their respective type of truthmaker, accordance with reality in the one case, useful in some respect in the other.
. Toward the end of section of Gnosiology, shortly following his explanations of classical and utilitarian views, Kotarbiński o ers a critique of what he takes to be a typical classical theory's understanding of 'accordance with reality. ' is is the passage on which Künne relies for his claim that Kotarbiński eschews a relational understanding of truth. is makes it crucial for the interpretation of Tarski before us. But although Kotarbiński uses truly here as well as true, an adverbial reading is, again, not in question. Rather, he states only that the accord in question cannot be taken pictographically, in the way a photograph or portrait is meant to resemble its subject. He rightly notes that 'good copy or simile' , as it serves in classical theory, is merely a metaphor. Künne cannot get the mileage out of this caveat that he requires. Options are readily available for a robust notion of accordance with reality that do not rely on a literal comparison with pictographic or point-for-point concordances. Moreover, a number of correspondence theorists have not been under the sway of picture theories of meaning or truth. Kotarbiński
See, e.g. J. L. Austin (Austin , ) : " ere is no need whatsoever for the words used in making a true statement to 'mirror' in any way, however indirect, any feature whatsoever of the situation or event; a statement no more needs, in order to be true, to reproduce the 'multiplicity' , say, or the 'structure' or 'form' of reality, than a word needs to be echoic or writing pictographic. "
does not say in this place what a better understanding might be. However, even in the absence of a positive alternative, it is not very persuasive that giving up the pictographic model of accordance with reality leads directly to such severe conceptual surgery, leaving no room for any palpable relational reading of the phrase. It would be overreading this passage to take 'agreement with reality' in such an unusually narrow way, much less as an argument to the e ect that Kotarbiński convinced Tarski to give up a relational conception of truth.
us far I have not mentioned force-ampli ers. But they do intrude and signi cantly hamper Künne's take on Tarski. Earlier I followed Künne's rendition into semi-formal English of Tarski's ( ): 'For all sentences x, x is true ⇐⇒ x means that things are thus and so, and things are thus and so' . But Künne not only replaces the phrase 'states of a airs' (occurring in the standard English translation) by 'things' , but also omits the telling word, 'indeed' , that even he could not wholly overlook. Künne's full translation is: a true sentence is one which means that things are thus and so, and things (indeed) are thus and so' . e italicized phrase is the direct translation of the crucial part of the sentence from which Künne constructs ( ); and aside from the parentheses around 'indeed' , it is a close literal translation of Tarski's words as they appear in German. However, Künne seems con dent in omitting that word from his English rendering of Tarski's ( ), because, he claims, "Tarski himself stressed ['indeed's'] redundancy" in § of ( ) (Künne , n ). What Tarski writes in that place is:
It has been claimed that-due to the fact that a sentence like 'snow is white' is taken to be semantically true if snow is in fact white. . . -logic nds itself involved in a most uncritical realism (Tarski , ) .
(Notice that in the original English Tarski writes 'in fact' rather than 'indeed' .) However, rather than stressing in fact's (or indeed's) redundancy, quite the contrary Tarski maintains that it imports content of the wrong kind. He begins by noting that the words 'in fact' are misleading "even if they do not a ect the content. " But do they a ect the content? Tarski's clear verdict is that they do, because "these words convey the impression that the semantic conception of truth is intended to establish the conditions under which we are warranted in asserting any given sentence" (Tarski , ) . Put otherwise, he holds that they have an epistemic force, a suggestion of assertibility Although Künne also displays the original Polish, of which I have no knowledge, if the force-ampli er did not appear in Polish it strikes me as unlikely that Tarski would have inserted it in his German version, or that Künne would have needed to make the point he does about its redundancy.
conditions. at is how he takes the charge of an uncritical realism here. at particular interpretation of 'in fact' appears to me, as I think it will to most, mistaken. Nevertheless, to reject 'in fact' because of its alleged epistemic liaisons is not to agree with Künne that it is merely redundant, and Tarski's assessment does not give us a clue about what he might have thought of its presence if he was not under this misimpression about its assertibility implications.
. Kotarbiński , too, uses force-ampli ers. Consider the following passage:
'Jan thinks truly if and only if Jan thinks that things are thus and so, and things are indeed thus and so' . . . . For instance, the central idea of the Copernican theory is. . . that the earth revolves around the sun; now Copernicus thought truly, for he thought that the earth revolves around the sun, and the earth does revolve around the sun. Künne ( , ) remarks of the occurrence of 'indeed' in the rst sentence that it is "logically redundant. " Elsewhere he states of a similar occurrence that it is a "logically super uous adverb. " Let us call such assessments dismissive. Other than telling what force 'indeed' does not have, he does not say what role it might have in such utterances. A common view accompanying dismissive accounts is that force-ampli ers merely emphasize, are emphatic ways of putting forward, the content they qualify. For the special case of ampli ers-viz., this class of phrases, in ections, etc. used in clauses stating truth-conditions or that they have (/have not) been satis ed-I want to contrast dismissive accounts with what we may call robust ones. A robust account regards the ampli ers as a ecting our understanding of the truth conditions of the clauses in which they occur. Generally speaking, they can be robust in one of two ways. First, they might interject additional content in those clauses (say, as a sentential operator on the order of 'it is necessary that'). Second, they may be more like instructions on how to understand the clause. is last partition is not any sharper than the troubled division between semantics and pragmatics. But there are clear cases on both sides. Eventually, I shall o er a robust account of the second type. But rst I want to examine more closely the character of dismissive accounts. Kotarbiński , as quoted, and translated (from German), in (Künne , ) . e rst sentence of the English translation from Polish (Kotarbiński , ) reads "John thinks truly if and only if John thinks that things are so and so, and things in fact are so and so" (my emphasis).
It is not uncommon to nd those who agree with Künne's negative assessment of 'indeed' and other ampli ers. Given the context to which I have restricted force-ampli cation (viz., the formulation of truth-conditions or an a rmation that they have, or have not, been met) it is usually made quite explicit that this enables one to give an austere gloss of the passage as distinct from a di erentiated reading. us, for Künne, Kotarbiński's sentence conveys no more than if the latter wrote 'Jan thinks truly if and only if Jan thinks that things are thus and so, and things are thus and so' . Bearing in mind that the sentence must be enunciated without any emphasis in the second clause, this construal strikes me as inherently implausible. Has 'indeed' no role beyond being decorative? Of course, austerity is not mandated by Künne's account of the force-ampli er. But assuming an austere account is a possibility, adopting it removes a serious obstacle to a de ationary interpretation of this passage.
It seems equally implausible that the whole point of 'indeed' here is to add emphasis to an independent claim. As mentioned earlier, the expressions cited as force-ampli ers are sometimes used merely for emphasis. If I unfairly doubted that Smith's intention to enroll in law school was serious, someone might reply 'He really did enroll' , or 'In fact, he enrolled' . As a matter of fact, each of the terms cited from this class may be strictly used as an emphasizer when not behaving as a force-ampli er, and that employment may be its more central use. us, remarks such as the following are in perfectly good order:
In fact, the older version of the so ware works better.
Indeed, the highest paid player earns more than the team owner.
Actually, I' d rather nish reading this chapter rst.
Really, you mean to say that she never had formal musical training! However, when what is at issue is what to make of the constructions in the contexts to which force-ampli cation has been restricted, that account struggles. But before formally presenting my competing force-ampli cation thesis let us brie y examine the larger point Künne wishes his dismissive commentary to serve.
He is defending a de ationist interpretation of Kotarbiński. e logical neglibility of indeed brings the latter's view in line with (R). But equally, the ability to dismiss the contribution of force-ampli cation in interpreting its phrases supports Künne's own de ationary view, a view he calls a modest account of truth, or MOD. It is summarized in the formula:
in which the brackets around 'p' are singular-term-forming operators and can be rendered as the phrase 'the proposition that. . . ' . eir function is to take us from a sentence expressing a certain proposition to a term designating that proposition.
MOD is de ationary because it implies that an adequate account of the notion or property truth (or the predicate 'is true') need not invoke any of a true proposition's relations to a nonsemantic, nonepistemic reality. It is played o against what I earlier called, using Künne's preferred terminology, a relational account. MOD is, in brief, a re nement of (R), the proposition that p is true if and only if p. For Künne, Kotarbiński not only lends a cachet of respectable lineage to his own account, but his way of achieving his view is an integral part of Künne's own rationale. But if Kotarbiński is to be perceived as clearing the path for de ationism, it must be explained why the presence of 'indeed' in the quoted passage does not destroy the picture. is is the background against which Künne dismisses force-ampli ers.
e biconditionals in (R) and (T) di er from the Kotarbiński passage in two respects that may be ignored for our purposes. First, the contrast in question is between the sentences (or propositions) on the le -and righthand sides of the biconditional rather than between a pair of conjuncts occurring only on the right. Second, the sentences on the right side of the equivalences need not be, and given their purposes will not be, compounds. (Given recursion, we do not require separate truth-theorems for (truth-functional) compounds.) But all that matters is that precisely the same issues concerning force-ampli ers arise here. Still, in light of the problems already uncovered with austere interpretations, Künne's interpretation would be no boon to a (supposedly) de ationary Kotarbiński. Rehearsing some of the steps in § , I cited a potential ambiguity in the way the equivalences could be, and have been, regarded, between a semantically di erentiated interpretation and the austere gloss or interpretation that de ationists should favor. Disregarding the various objections I made to the de ationist interpretation, what concerns us now is only the fact that it has been put into prominent play in the literature. is alone supplies a su cient motive for those who want to avoid being so understood to signify as much, and therefore to make clear that what they have in mind is the need to import the extralinguistic world to explain truth. By now it should not surprise anyone that I am suggesting that this is the core role of force-ampli ers: (Künne , ) . I ignore the issue, raised by MOD, of quanti cation over sentences. Künne squarely confronts it, and argues that he is entitled to it without resorting to substitutional quanti cation (FA) Force-ampli ers, when used in constructions stating truth-conditions (say, in conjunctions and biconditionals), or stating that the conditions have been satis ed, dictate that the compound is to be given a semantically di erentiated interpretation.
at, harmlessly simpli ed, is the thesis I am defending. (FA) is proposed as su cient and central for force-ampli cation, not as necessary. It is not intended to exhaust the contexts of such ampli ers. In the third example with which this essay opened-'What she suspected was in fact the case'-no compound occurs and the contents of her suspicion are not disclosed. Moreover, force-ampli ers may also be used to deny that the truthconditions have been satis ed. When used in those circumstances, only a limited class of ampli ers are appropriate. However, I want to begin by defending (FA) in cases in which truth-conditions, or their satisfaction, are expressed. We may then extend that role to closely parallel cases. (Some are discussed in § .) e crucial feature of our targeted cases is that two contents are displayed or implied, and the contents of the two sides are very similarly worded, no doubt suspiciously so to some. It is not credible to suppose that there is no point to this ritualized repetition. In the rst part, there is a semanticallyevaluable proposition-something it is possible to regard as taking a semantic value, most importantly a truth-value. Occasionally the proposition is not given in full, or is given only indirectly. However, the phrasing assures us of the availability of a similar content speci able at the other end. Or, in cases mentioned below, in which the force-ampli ers are used to a rm the falsity of the content, the second proposition may be like the rst but for the presence (/absence) of a crucial negative element lacking (/present) in the rst one. In the clearest cases, such as the rst sentence of the quote that opened this section, the repetition of the proposition is right there on the surface. And if we held that the force-ampli ers were doing no more than underlining the preceding utterance, we would be led to the view that the utterer was saying one thing, and then simply repeating herself emphatically a second time. is would be scarcely more promising than rejecting a di erentiated interpretation without any alternative to o er.
In sum, it is in contexts where expressions from our designated class attach either to a display of a truth-condition for a statement, sentence, belief, etc., or to an a rmation that the condition for truth (or falsity) has obtained, that they serve as di erentiated interpretations for force-ampli ers. Accordingly, I maintain that the occurrence of 'indeed' in the Kotarbiński passage is robust; it signals his di erentiated interpretation of the truth formula. Künne states, following what he takes to be Bolzano's view, that it "is logically redundant: it serves the same purpose as the move in that same quotation from 'revolves' to 'does revolve"' . But what Künne takes this second part of the passage to illustrate is no more persuasive than his account of the rst one. When Kotarbiński states that Copernicus "thought that the earth revolves around the sun", then adds that the earth does revolve around the sun, the in ection (however slight) we give to 'does' in the second conjunct supplies more than mere a repetition of the content of Copernicus's thought. It indicates that the thought is true, because the conditions for its being so have been satis ed. Merely to state that someone thought something a rms nothing, as such, about that thought's truth.
Curiously enough Künne inadvertently and implicitly attests at least to the range of force-ampli ers by his own summary of his interpretation. He writes, "A proposition X is true, according to the modest account, if and only if things really are as they are according to X" (Künne , , rst emphasis mine), and earlier he stated "When is Jan thinking truly (that is, in agreement with reality) that there are bears in the Capathians? Just in case Jan is thinking that there are bears in the Carpathians, and there really are bears in the Carpathians" (Künne , , second emphasis mine). I do not see how Künne can avoid agreeing with me that these occurrences of 'really' are performing precisely the same job as is performed by 'indeed' and 'in fact' in the earlier examples. But, then, for Künne they must be "'logically redundant' and, thus, negligible"-the very conclusion he reaches about our instance of 'indeed' . Why bother inserting them? at they make some difference can be seen by trying to rewrite them with 'really' deleted. But can Künne tell us what di erence they make? us far, he has given us no account of the truth-ampli ers to explain this. Might they be mere rhetorical ourishes? What more can he consistently say about them? e only promising proposal on o er, so far as I can tell, is (FA).
As further support for his view, Künne cites a passage from Frank Ramsey (Ramsey , ) in which the latter used the example, 'the things he believed to be connected by certain relations were, in fact, connected by that relation' . In a footnote attached to the phrase 'in fact' Ramsey writes "[i]n a sentence like this 'in fact' serves simply to show that the oratio obliqua introduced by 'he believed' has now come to an end. It does not mean a new notion to be analyzed, but is simpl[y] a connecting particle" ( (Ramsey , To drive home the point, and show how Künne's use of the evidence back res, note that on his interpretation it would not matter if we replaced these words with the simpler, 'he thought the earth revolves around the sun, and the earth revolves around the sun' . is deviates from Kotarbiński's statement only by omitting 'does' following the second occurrence of 'earth' (and, as grammar requires, making the second 'revolve' agree with the subject). Try to read the second conjunct naturally without any in ection (say on 'and' or on a number of other words in it). I cannot do it. A similar problem emerges with Künne's own prose in the next paragraph. n ) reading 'simply' for 'simple'). However, Ramsey, unlike Künne, is offering a positive thesis about the place of 'in fact': namely, it shows that the oratio obliqua clause specifying the belief has come to an end. Nevertheless, Künne might take solace from this much-according to Ramsey, the forceampli er is doing nothing further here. And that might be enough to show, to the latter's satisfaction, that it is logically super uous.
Ramsey's explanation is di cult to generalize. However, in the particular case he o ers, it does compete with (FA) as an explanation. us, it is worth noting that his account fails even on its own turf. Ramsey's resolution turns on distinguishing the content of this belief from a belief whose content would be the whole of the following: ( ) the things connected by certain relations were connected by those relations.
is utterly trivial belief is of course di erent from that ascribed in Ramsey's example (viz., that things are connected by certain relations). Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to assign a connecting (perhaps conjunctive) role to 'in fact' in this context because the example does not contain any more typical English connective words (e.g., 'and' or 'but'). But Ramsey's case quickly falls apart. First, his claim no longer works if we modify the example slightly to read:
'he believed things to be connected by a certain relation and they were, in fact, connected by that relation' 'In fact' is no less natural here, and seems to be playing much the same role it did in the original example.
us, even if it had to do double duty in Ramsey's example (because of the absence of any explicit connective), its primary role is not diminished when we use a di erent term to perform the role Ramsey cites. Second, the role given 'in fact' , is ultimately futile for distinguishing ( ) from the actual oratio obliqua. For if the content of the belief could have been that speci ed in ( ), nothing, save the very same unnaturalness, prevents it from being: ( ) the things connected by certain relations were, in fact, connected by those relations.
And in ( ) the force-ampli er does not indicate that the belief has come to an end. e point here is that it is natural to parse Ramsey's original sentence so that the belief speci cation ends before the word 'were' . And that understanding would have been no less natural if the phrase 'in fact' had been absent.
us, if we are to nd a role for 'in fact' in that example, we must look elsewhere. (I do not profess to know why Ramsey's, and his audience's, intuitive parsing is the natural one, but an educated guess might appeal to avoiding the attribution to a subject of so unlikely a remark as ( ) or ( ). Compare, for example, Russell's case of the guest remarking artlessly to the yacht owner 'I thought your yacht was larger than it is' , and getting back the indignant, and clearly contrived, reply 'No, my yacht is not larger than it is!' No interjection of 'in fact' a er 'than' is needed to construe 'than it is' as an intended worldly condition rather than as a constituent of what the rst speaker was trying to express-just the point Russell makes.) I noted earlier that a robust role for force-ampli ers might take one of two forms. Let us look again brie y at those options.
First, Evans ( ) and Wiggins ( ) regard the presence of the quali er 'really' as basically a sentential operator.
eir focus is quite di erent from the present one, and the sentential contexts they treat prevent 'really' from being a force-ampli er there. But we could imagine extending both 'really' and the other ampli ers as operators governing sentences stating truth-conditions, and this would involve those ampli ers contributing genuine semantic content to their clauses.
Second, we might take force-amplifiers to be something like a Fregean assertion sign (Frege , -) or a speech-act indicator, what has been variously called, among other things, a neustic (Hare ) , mood (Dummett ) , and function-indicator (Searle ) . ey do not contribute semantic content as such, but rather indicate something about how the clause over which they operate is to be taken.
It might be thought that the rst choice places robust force-ampli ers in better stead. Semantic contributions are weighty. Moreover, if they do not make a semantic contribution, they must be merely pragmatic elements, and this throws them into a ragbag category in which they keep company with such at best marginal denizens as ordinary psychological associations. Nevertheless, although any decision here must be tentative, I believe it best to class force-ampli ers as indicators of how the clause is to be taken rather than components of the clauses themselves. e reason is that (on our generous assumption) the clauses in question are already semantically ambiguous, and ambiguous constructions already have (at least implicitly) a disjunction of their permissible meanings.
us, everything a semantically di erentiated interpretation of a truth-condition contains is present, even if only implicitly, before force-ampli ers come on the scene. For all that the ampli ers Roughly, and despite di erences in their treatments, each is concerned with moving out of ctional contexts to existential claims about elements in the ction. It is doubtful that anything they say about that will be directly relevant to our concerns. Cf. (Whitehead and Russell , ) . make a robust rather than a dismissive contribution to reading the clauses, for they make one of these interpretations unavoidable. is also has the advantage of avoiding what would be at least an embarrassment for a robust account. For, if force-ampli cation were conceived as making a semantic contribution, it would be unclear just what semantic contribution it could make given that the di erentiated interpretation was already a (natural) possibility.
To see how neglecting this second prospect for robustness can skew the discussion, consider a comment by Mark Sainsbury ( ), weighing in on the issue about 'really' addressed by Evans and Wiggins. In the course of his exposition he states emphatically "that 'really' , at least as used in ordinary English, makes no contribution to truth conditions" (Sainsbury , ) . is looks like dismissive commentary. However, upon closer examination it is clear that he means that 'really' adds nothing semantic to truth conditions. is need not prevent it from making a contribution of another kind. In fact, a subsequent list of functions Sainsbury produces for ordinary uses of 'really' contains an item that comes close to (FA). He calls the function in question 'Pre-emptive strike against contrasting views ' (Sainsbury , ) . is is precisely what (FA) states that force-ampli ers do when inserted in statements of truth-conditions or their satisfaction. us, if we're not to be stuck with the stark, inadequate list of choices of either adding something semantic to truth conditions or being of no informational signi cance, we must acknowledge that 'really' can contribute without adding excess semantic content.
What further evidence might be o ered on behalf of (FA)? At this stage, perhaps the best argument available is to take a number of cases in which force-ampli ers have occurred in the literature and in which dismissive accounts of them and austere glosses of the whole phrases are highly implausible. Because there is nothing in the Kotarbiński passage to distinguish it from these other occurrences, if Künne is correct about that passage, we ought to be able to extend his negative assessment to these other occurrences. us, I brie y consider force-ampli ers as they have occurred elsewhere in the philosophical literature to illustrate further the weakness in their cavalier dismissals.
. I begin with Quine, who declares: e sentence 'Snow is white' is true, as Tarski has taught us, if and only if real snow is really white (Quine , , my emphases) .
Unquestionably, 'real' is doing more for 'snow' than emphasizing that word. e intended contrast is probably with something in the area of fake snow. But I certainly take it also to rule out, by implication, that the question is only whether the word-in this case 'snow'-rather than some other word, is under consideration. If so, what plausible option is there to regarding 'really' as serving the same purpose for 'is. . . white'? A semantically differentiated interpretation is irresistible here and ts well with what Quine says elsewhere about the determinants of truth.
A second instance. G. E. Moore ( ) asks us to imagine a friend who believes that he (Moore) has gone away for a holiday: "his belief that I have gone away cannot be true unless I actually have gone away. " And, in stressing that this is su cient for its truth as well, Moore adds, "my having actually gone away for my holidays is both a necessary and su cient condition for the truth of this belief " (Moore , , rst emphasis added) . Unless this last claim is semantically di erentiated it is hard to see how it could be necessary and su cient, in the sense Moore intends, for the truth of the belief. Could the bare proposition (or sentence) 'I have gone away' be a truth-condition for the belief? To add to the implausibility of that interpretation, Moore's restatement of the point in the second passage uses the non-propositional, substantial, phrase 'my having actually gone away' which is neither a proposition nor a sentence. Is not it clear that he is intending the same thing in both passages, although the second is a noun-phrase rather than a sentence, and thus not a prime candidate for just being another way to express the same thing as the described belief content of which 'is true' is predicated?
Next, Bertrand Russell ( ), attacking James's pragmatic theory of truth, writes ". . . what I desire is not that the belief in solipsism should be false in the pragmatic sense, but that people should in fact exist" (Russell , , my emphasis) . And, in the same vein he states shortly therea er that the pragmatists' position "if they fully realized it, would, I think, be this: 'We cannot know whether, in fact, there is a God or a future life, but we can know that the belief in God and a future life is true"' (Russell , , my emphasis) . Look again at the part of the latter quotation following the colon. No doubt, Russell is satirizing a view he takes to be hopeless. If we accept the view that the force-ampli er, 'in fact' , makes no di erence to the cognitive content of what is said, we preserve its content without loss if we reword it to read:
We can know that God exists and there is a future life is true, but we cannot know that God exists and that there is a future life.
is is close to self-contradiction. It is of the form:
X can know that p is true, but X cannot know that p.
e one thing that saves it from being an outright inconsistency is the bare conceivability that one might be said to know the truth of something (say, on authority) that one does not understand; so that one knows (or, can know) that p is true without knowing that p. However, even if this is intelligible, it is remote from anything Russell has in mind here. I cannot see any way to capture his intent without taking the existence of God and of a future life to have as their subject-matter conditions in the nonsemantic world. And if this is so, the interjection of 'in fact' would appear to be inserted precisely to drive that point home.
Next It is hard to see how anything less than a semantically-di erentiated interpretation could capture Alston's point. To illustrate, suppose the statement in question is an assertion of the sentence 'the keys are in my pocket ' . Now "what the statement says to be the case" is not a statement expressible with the sentence "the keys are in my pocket' is true' or the proposition that the keys are in my pocket is true. Rather what the statement says to be the case is simply that the keys are in my pocket, sans any predication of 'is true' . If the word 'actually' were no more than conversational lagree, as the dismissive outlook suggests, it would yield no direction about how the cognitive content should be taken. But much more seems to be going on. For on the right-hand side we have not only what the de ationist demands ('what the statement says to be the case'), but also an addendum to it ('actually is the case'). is second condition could not add anything to what has gone before unless Alston had in mind a semantically di erentiated reading.
Next, in the rst sentence of the passage below, Larson and Segal make clear without need for further commentary how they regard the force-ampli er in the second sentence:
[T]he property of being true or false depends on two things: what the sentence means and how things are in the extralinguistic world. us Camels have humps is true because it means what it does and because camels do, in fact, have humps. (Larson and Segal , ) Finally, Christopher Hill ( ) takes it for granted that the use of the force-ampli er 'actually' makes it clear that the conditions under discussion are worldly, substantial ones rather than de ationary ones. He defends what he calls a correspondence intuition to the e ect that "when a thought counts as true, it does so in virtue of the fact that the corresponding circumstance actually obtains. " He then formulates this o cially as: "(CT) For any thought x, x is true if and only if there is a state of a airs y such that (a) x semantically corresponds to y, and (b) y actually obtains" (Hill , ) .
It is evident that Hill believes that (a) might have been understood austerely, or there would be no point to adding (b). What in (b) accomplishes its di erentiated interpretation? It could not be just the phrase 'y obtains'; that is as vulnerable to a de ationist construal as 'x semantically corresponds to y' in (a). Rather he makes the thrust of his remark unmistakable by inserting the force-ampli er 'actually' . is, then, enables him to state shortly therea er that "[i]t is clear that (CT) is at variance with every theory that counts as a version of classical de ationism. " is train of instances illustrates the quite general practice of using forceampli ers to make as clear as possible one's intention to appeal to in ationary truth-conditions. ere is no ground for taking Kotarbiński's use of them di erently. Returning brie y to the particular case of his would-be de ationism, Künne initially bases his interpretation on his own account of Kotarbiński's Reism, given by Künne, you may recall, as: (K) x thinks truly ⇐⇒ (x thinks that. . . , and. . . ).
But Reism by itself does not install de ationism. e resort to an adverbial notion of truth, for whatever reason, tells us how to regard the truthbearer, but it does not commit us to that bearer acquiring the status of being truly so in any particular way. (Indeed, the same could be said of Künne's MOD.) us, the de ationary/in ationary status of Kotarbiński's view depends on how he would regard the second conjunct on the right side of the biconditional in (K), not on the formulation per se. And it seems he makes his intentions as clear as we might hope for in the quoted passage at the beginning of § . (FA) can, of course, stand without Kotarbiński's support. But Künne's commentary is instructive because it is typical of a certain kind of maneuver adopted for ignoring without toil the most direct way others have had to make plain their rejection of a de ationist construal of their remarks.
. e situations treated above are not the only problems confronting an austere gloss and a dismissive account of force-ampli ers. Here are some other tough cases.
Recall that we have a force-ampli er, playing just the role in a specication of a truth-condition or that one has been satis ed, even on some occasions in which no truth predicate or operator appears in the formula.
is eliminates any opportunity for de ationist thesis (D ): whatever the speci cation of truth-conditions is doing, it cannot be showing how we may state the le -side more simply. In this connection, consider again Ramsey's example: the things he believed to be connected by certain relations were, in fact, connected by that relation.
On the surface this does not seem to be a compound. However, it is easy enough to replace it with a compound that still captures the spirit of Ramsey's example while having the added advantage of specifying an actual belief content. For example:
( ) Fred believes that the species are connected by common descent and, in fact, they are connected by common descent.
While it may seem promising in a case such as 'it is true that snow is white' to say that 'snow is white' expresses the same thing, only more parsimoniously, no one will be tempted to say that 'snow is white' says the same thing as 'Fred believes that snow is white' . Still, in ( ) we do have the same range of potential semantic values for the propositional clause in the rst conjunct, and the same sort of nonsemantic condition in the second-the one expressing that the truth-conditions for Fred's belief are satis ed. Furthermore, because the point is just as strong without the interjection of the force-ampli er, let us provisionally delete it. Nevertheless, a di erentiated interpretation seems mandatory here. e designator in the rst conjunct, the content of Fred's belief, designates what is, broadly speaking, semantic. I am not supposing that Fred must have expressed, or even be able to express, his thought in words, not even sotto voce.
us, the phrase may be evaluable only on one's favorite psychosemantics, not on its linguistic twin. However, as long as we have a propositional content designated, expressions of semantic appraisal such as 'is true' , 'is about' , 'describes . . . as' , and so on are appropriate characterizations. Moreover, we are prohibited from concluding that the proposition designated by those words (at least without consideration of the second conjunct) must be a (nonsemantic) fact-Fred may have a false belief. us, it is not an accident that the le -hand conjunct need not contain a truth predicate or operator to clarify the way it is to be read.
In spite of that, the satisfaction of the belief 's truth-condition is speci ed in the second conjunct. at conjunct's semantic liaison will be some sort of worldly condition or n-tuple of particulars and features. What appears on the right-hand side is not destined ex vi termini to have as a value a semantic Pace Plato (in the voice of the stranger): " inking and discourse are the same thing, except that what we call thinking is, precisely, the inward dialogue carried on by the mind itself without spoken sound" (Plato , e) . Or, as Peter Geach once remarked about Hobbes, for him ratio is oratio.
component. What is speci ed there is quite literally something occurring 'in deed' rather than in thought or speech. So, it seems that an austere gloss is not in the o ng. If we do not opt for a di erentiated interpretation, in the absence of a new entrant we seem le without any suggestions for construing ( ).
Next, there are also instances in which a rst conjunct has a constituent designating a semantically evaluable item, but in which the satisfaction conditions speci ed in the second conjunct (with the help of force-ampli ers) are not truth-conditions. Strictly speaking, occurrences of interjections in these cases cannot be force-ampli ers as earlier de ned. Nevertheless, they are close enough to our target cases to hold lessons for our subject:
( ) e score called for the passage to be played slowly, and, indeed (/in fact), it was performed slowly. (/. . . and it really was performed slowly).
( ) He painted the Duke with a crooked smile, and (/because), indeed, the Duke had a crooked smile.
A musical score and a portrait are representations, and thus admit semantic evaluation. Nevertheless, there is no way in which the musical performance or the Duke's smile could be assimilated to the content of a score or to paint on canvass. Such cases drive home the point that Künne's and/or Ramsey's dismissive summaries of force-ampli ers do not apply in these strikingly analogous cases. Strangely enough, in these instances it is plausible to argue that the relevant expressions are inserted precisely for emphasis. (Recall that although neither Künne nor Ramsey explicitly give this as a role for ampli ers, it is a natural move on the part of those who hold that ampli ers add nothing to the interpretation or content of the clauses.) But what they emphasize in these cases can be nothing other than the worldlyconditions preventing a de ationary reading of them. I would venture that such cases seem not only to strengthen (FA), but also point toward a natural extension of it.
More bluntly still, sometimes the second conjunct, even when truthconditions are in play, shows a departure from the semantically evaluable part. us: ( ) Jan thinks he won the gold medal, but in fact he only won the silver.
( ) e score called for the passage to be played largo, but, indeed (/in fact) it was played much too fast.
( ) He painted the Duke with a crooked smile, but the Duke does not actually have a crooked smile.
It is di cult to believe that the interjections 'indeed' , 'actually' , and 'in fact' are performing a service so di erent in kind in ( )-( ) than those they were performing in ( ). And in ( )-( ) it seems clear that they are ruling out any trace of doubt that the second conjunct takes us from a representational content to the part or aspect of the world relevant to the respective representation's evaluation. ere may be a reduced urgency for force-ampli ers in such cases, but it has not been shown that they are wholly pointless; at worst they belabor something that typical audiences will have already taken for granted.
.
Finally, a brief glimpse at how the terms we have enlisted for their role in (FA) enter into broader con icts over representational theories. e simplest case is reference. Suppose for the sake of argument it is maintained that the following is an instance of a legitimate condition for reference: Telescoping a number of anti-representationalist arguments, the de ationist view here would be that N. Bourbaki's existing comes to nothing more than facts about our usage of the name 'N. Bourbaki' . It does not invoke name-world relations.
While the interjection of the terms in the title does not settle the issue between representational and nonrepresentational theories of reference, any more than it settled the issue between de ationary and correspondence theories of truth, an extension of (FA) to these sorts of cases does, I am hopeful, eliminate one sort of maneuver which may have attracted nonrepresentationalists. at is, by interjecting one of these terms on the right-hand side of the conditional, and obtaining, say: ( ′ ) 'N. Bourbaki' refers to N. Bourbaki only if N. Bourbaki actually exists a speaker may make plain her intention that the condition for reference in question be something, as we might say, worldly. is interpretation can be ruled out only if one holds that these terms cannot have any role in contributing to or indicating something about the content of the relevant clauses in which they appear. Since we have seen that view to have failed as a general prescription, we have good reason to reject it here. If we then extend our notion of a force-ampli er to the occurrence of such terms in any context supplying representational conditions, we could easily enough extend (FA) to representation generally:
